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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PENNSYLVANIA
AND FEDERAL TESTS OF SUFFICIENCY OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
AND THE CHOICE OF LAW IN FEDERAL
DIVERSITY CASES
By STEHEN

M.

FELDMAN*

Often when the parties to a lawsuit are of diverse citizenship
the plaintiff's attorney must choose whether to bring the action
in a state or federal court. Aside from other considerations that
may exist, such as ability to make service of process,' liberality of
discovery 2 and liberality of the rules governing admissibility of
evidence, when the plaintiff's case rests on circumstantial evidence and there is a question whether the plaintiff will be able to
*B.A., 1952; L.L.B., 1955, University of Pennsylvania; member of Pennsylvania Bar; associated with Malis & Feldman, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. In Hanna v. Plumber, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Supreme Court in
a diversity case upheld service of process which conformed with FED. R.
Crv. P. 4 even though the service was invalid under state law. In addition,
a line of federal cases has developed which is considerably more liberal
than Pennsylvania law in holding local persons to be de facto agents of
foreign defendants. See, e.g., Boryk v. De Haviland Aircraft Corp., 341
F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965); Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 276 F. Supp. 58
(E.D. Pa. 1967); Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 267 F. Supp.
709 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
2. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 with PA. R. Civ. P. 4001-4020.
3. See, e.g., Rain v. Pavkov, 357 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1966) which holds
a prior plea of guilty to reckless driving admissible in a personal injury
action in the federal court even though it would be inadmissible in the
state court under state statute. Also the Federal Business Records Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964), is considerably more liberal than the Pennsylvania
Act. PA. STAT. ANN. § 91b. Thus, diagnoses in hospital records are admissible in the federal courts and inadmissible in the Pennsylvania Courts.
Cf. Johnson v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 335 F.2d 904, 906 (3d
Cir. 1964); Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1962); and Paxos v.
Also police reports are adJarka Corp., 314 Pa. 148, 171 A. 468 (1934).
missible in their entirety in the federal courts, while they are admissible
in the Pennsylvania courts only insofar as based on the personal knowledge
of the investigating officer. Cf. Salsberg v. Modern Transfer Co., 324 F.2d
737 (2d Cir. 1963); Moran v. Pittsburgh Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467
(3d Cir. 1950); and Haas v. Kasnot, 371 Pa. 580, 92 A.2d 171 (1952).
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produce sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury, consideration should be given to whether the requirements of proof
of circumstantial evidence are less stringent in the federal court.
Although there are undoubtedly a great many situations where
the evidence produced will be either sufficient or insufficient regardless of whether the Pennsylvania or federal test of sufficiency is applied, there are two main areas where the choice of
law may have a material effect on the outcome of the litigation:
(1) the overall test of sufficiency; and (2) the requirements of
expert opinion.
THE PENNSYLVANIA

RULE ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Any discussion of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence
under
Pennsylvania law must begin with Smith v. Bell Telephone
Co.,4 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania overruled a
long line of cases which held that "the circumstances must be so
strong as to preclude the possibility of injury in any other way
and provide as the only reasonable inference the conclusion plaintiff advances." 5 The Smith case established the following as the
appropriate rules for Pennsylvania:
[T]he evidence presented must be such that by reasoning
from it, without resort to prejudice or guess, a jury can
reach the conclusion sought by plaintiff and not that that
conclusion must be the only one which logically can be
reached ....
[I] t is beyond the power of the court to say
whether two or more reasonable inferences are "equal".
... The right of a litigant to have the jury pass upon the
facts is not to be foreclosed just because the judge believes
that a reasonable man might find properly either way.6
A thorough understanding of the effect of the Smith decision,
however, requires in addition to a knowledge of the rules stated in
the opinion, an examination of the factual situations to which those
rules have subsequently been applied. Smith involved a claim
for damages to plaintiff's sewer line. After sewage was found to be
backing into plaintiff's basement, exploration along the sewer
line revealed that defendant's telephone conduit had crushed and
was blocking the sewer lateral. Plaintiff proved through defendant's employees that normal procedure was to construct a pier to
support the heavy conduit whenever the conduit crossed a sewer
line within the minimum allowable clearance. No such pier was
constructed on the plaintiff's property. Defendant's hypothesis was
4. 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477 (1959).
5. Id. at 137, 153 A.2d at 479. The Smith case does not purport to
abolish the authority of all prior circumstantial evidence cases decided by
the Pennsylvania courts. In Smith the court cites several prior cases which

had "in substance" applied the rule enunciated in Smith. Id. at 139, 153
A.2d at 480.
6. Id. at 138-139, 153 A.2d at 479-480.
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that at the time of construction, soil conditions may have been
such that construction of a supporting pier was unnecessary and
that the accident may have been caused by a change in soil conditions or by the action of subterranean waters, an occurrence the
supreme court characterized as "unlikely."7 Defendant's additional hypothesis that the collapse of the sewer lateral was caused
by the action of sewage was characterized by the court as "patently
absurd.""
Thus, under the Smith facts plaintiff had produced the only
reasonable inference of how the accident occurred and was entitled to have his case submitted to the jury under the Pennsylvania rule prior to Smith. This was the conclusion of Justice Bell,9
who concurred in the reversal of the judgment of nonsuit under the existing tests of sufficiency of circumstantial evidence.
The Smith case, therefore, although c6ntaining some liberal-sounding language, establishes no factual precedent. An examination
of the application of the Smith language to subsequent cases demonstrates that in practice the rule may not be as liberal as it at
first appears.
In Steiner v. Pittsburgh Rys.,' 0 the supreme court affirmed a
judgment of nonsuit in favor of the defendant, who operated an
inclined railway carrying passengers a distance of 2600 feet between the top and bottom of a hill in Pittsburgh. On the evening
in question the dismembered body of plaintiff's decedent, age 13, was
found along the track about half way up the hill. It was clear
that one of defendant's cars had passed over the body at least
once. Decedent had been last seen alive in defendant's station at
the foot of the hill standing in a line of 75 to 100 people who intended to board the next car. Plaintiff proved that defendant's
tracks were unlighted, that each car had only one light, and that the
cars were operated in a jerky manner with no accompanying guard.
Plaintiff asserted alternative theories of negligence. Either
decedent boarded defendant's car and fell off as a result of the
rough motion, or he was struck by defendant's car while walking up
the hill on a foot path which crosses the tracks. The supreme
court held that no evidence had been produced as to how decedent
met his death, that no evidence of negligence had been produced,
and that a verdict for the plaintiff would have to be based on conjecture.
In Flaherty v. Pennsylvania R.R., 11 the supreme court affirmed
a judgment n.o.v. in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff had
backed his truck against the open door of defendant's box car in
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 141, 153 A.2d at 481.
Id.
Id. at 143, 153 A.2d at 482.
415 Pa. 549, 204 A.2d 254 (1964).
426 Pa. 83, 231 A.2d 179 (1967).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

order to unload 150 cartons of paper napkins from the car to his
truck. The cartons were stacked in layers, seven feet high. While
the plaintiff was inside the railroad car, and standing on an improvised step about three cartons high, a number of boxes toppled on him. He fell to the floor and was knocked unconscious,
having no recollection of the cause of the accident. One of plaintiff's witnesses testified that a freight car, which had been parked
twenty feet from the box car was no longer present after the
accident. The witness saw an engine on the same track pulling two or three cars out of the yard while he was on the way
to help the injured plaintiff. After the accident, plaintiff's truck
was five or six feet east of the open door of the box car and the
plaintiff was about 15 feet east of the point where he had been
standing before the accident.
The plaintiff contended that defendant's engine had rammed
another car into the box car in which he was working. In a four to
three decision, the supreme court held plaintiff's evidence insufficient, stating merely that a verdict will not be sustained "which
is based on conjecture or surmise or guess." 12 In answering plaintiff's contention that he was entitled to recovery under the doctrine
of Smith v. Bell Telephone Co., 13 the court stated, without explana-

tion: "It will suffice to say that plaintiff's evidence has not
brought his claim within the rule laid down in [that case]."14
Steiner and Flaherty represent cases in which the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, without specifically saying so, seems to have
required the plaintiff to produce a stronger case than the broad
15
language of Smith would require. Similar examples may be found
but little purpose could be achieved by reviewing the facts of each
individually. It is, of course, difficult to glean a specific rule of law
from these cases. It is seldom that some distinguishing facts cannot be found between any two cases when the issue is whether there
is sufficient evidence to create a question for the jury. At the very
least, however, the Pennsylvania court seems to require that the
plaintiff be able to show some circumstance which indicates that
the accident happened the way he contends. In the absence of such
circumstance, where the accident may or may not have happened
as plaintiff contends, the evidence will be deemed insufficient. In
short, the plaintiff must have some basis for arguing that the
accident probably happened the way he contends and it is not
enough that the accident may possibly have happened that way.
Of course, the distinction between a probability and a possibility
may, under certain circumstances, be very elusive.
12. Id. at 85, 231 A.2d at 180.
13. 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477 (1959).
14. 426 Pa. at 85, 231 A.2d at 180.
15. See, e.g., Dorofey v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 674
(C.P. Cambria 1961), aff'd on opinion of court below, 407 Pa. 288, 180 A.2d
562 (1962); Johnston v. Dick, 401 Pa. 637, 165 A.2d 634 (1960).
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In Schwartz v. Warwick-PhiladelphiaCorp.,16 however, the supreme court did reverse a nonsuit in a case where there was no
circumstance indicating that the accident happened in the manner
which the plaintiff contended. In that case the plaintiff, who was
a guest at a wedding banquet at defendant's hotel, slipped on a
piece of asparagus which was on the dance floor. There was no
direct evidence as to how the asparagus got onto the floor. The
court held, nevertheless, that testimony that defendant's waiters
had been jostled while carrying trays with asparagus across the
crowded dance floor was sufficient evidence from which it could
be inferred that a waiter dropped the asparagus in question. Defendant's contention that the asparagus may have been carried to the
dance floor on the clothing of a guest was dismissed by the court
as absurd. 7
In terms of our prior analysis of Pennsylvania law, it may be
said that plaintiff's contention, being inherently more reasonable
or probable, outweighed the defendant's contention, which, in
effect, rose no higher than a possibility. It seems clear, however,
that had there been evidence in the Schwartz case that both
guests and waiters had been seen carrying asparagus across the
dance floor, the plaintiff's inability to point to a circumstance indicating that a waiter, rather than a guest, dropped the offending
asparagus would have been fatal to plaintiff's case.
One case which appears to depart from the prior line of
Pennsylvania authority is Hummel v. Womeldorf.'8 Plaintiff's
decedent was killed when the truck he was driving collided with a
tractor-trailer which defendant's employee had negligently parked
in the parking lot of a restaurant. There were no eye witnesses
to the accident. Defendant's employee was in the restaurant at the
time and it was not known how far away decedent was when the
tractor-trailer entered the highway. A jury trial resulted in a
verdict for the defendant and the trial judge denied plaintiff's
motion for new trial. The supreme court affirmed the judgment,
holding that the verdict for the defendant was justified on the basis
of decedent's contributory negligence in failing to stop in time to
avoid the collision. 19 In support of its position, the court observed
that "the inference that the Gibson rig had come to rest on the
highway at some time prior to the collision is just as permissible
from the evidence as the inference that it was still moving out of
16. 424 Pa. 185, 226 A.2d 424 (1967).
17. The Swartz opinion represents the views of only three of the
seven members of the Supreme Court since three justices concurred in the
result only and the Chief Justice dissented.
18. 426 Pa. 460, 223 A.2d 215 (1967).
19. Obviously a finding that defendant's agent was not negligent
could not be justified since he had left a large tractor-trailer unattended

with its motor running. From the fact that it drifted onto the highway,
the conclusion that it was parked improperly was inescapable.
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its parking space."'20 Thus, the court held, in effect, that since
the accident may have happened in either of two different ways,
the question was properly submitted to a jury. Although Hummel
involved circumstantial proof of contributory negligence, the test
set forth in that case is equally applicable to proof of negligence.
A further limitation on the proof of a cause of action by circumstantial evidence has begun to develop from the leading case
22
of Smith v. Bell Telephone Co.,21 which was discussed earlier.
In viewing the evidence in Smith the court stated:
We are not here faced with a case relying on circumstantial evidence to show both the happening of the accident
and the defendant's negligence. It is clear that the injury
was caused by the conduit crushing the sewer lateral. The
question is, did
23 defendants' negligence cause the conduit
so to behave?

The court apparently intended this statement only as an answer to
the lower court's holding that all plaintiff had proved was the
however, seized
"happening of the accident." Later cases have,
24
upon the language as establishing a rule of law.
In Johnston v. Dick,25 in which the supreme court affirmed
judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict on the
ground that there was insufficient evidence, Smith was distinguished on the ground that in Smith there was positive evidence
to establish the cause of the accident. And in Dorofey v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 in which a nonsuit was entered for the defendant,

Smith was again distinguished on the ground that in Smith "there
was positive evidence that an instrumentality of defendant had
caused the accident." 7 Undoubtedly the court could have reached
the same result in both Johnston and Dorofey without resort to
the proposition that circumstantial evidence may not be used to
prove both the cause of the accident and the negligence of the
defendant. It is, therefore, difficult to say whether that proposition has as yet solidified into a rule of law in Pennsylvania.
It is certainly safe to assume that if presented with a case
where cause and negligence are fairly proved by circumstantial evidence,2 8 the supreme court will not find itself bound by the
20. 426 Pa. at 464, 233 A.2d at 217.
21. 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477 (1959).
22. See text accompanying notes 4-9 supra.
23. 397 Pa. at 139, 153 A.2d at 480.
24. Compare the development of the privity doctrine from chance
dictum in Winterbottom v. Wright, 1O M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402
(1842). See W. PROssEm, Law of Torts, 658 (3d ed. 1964).
25. 401 Pa. 637, 643-44, 165 A.2d 634 (1960).
26. 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 674 (C.P. Cambria 1961), aff'd on opinion of
court below, 407 Pa. 288, 180 A.2d 562 (1962).
27. Id. at 680, 180 A.2d at 566.
28. But see Schwartz v. Warwick-Philadelphia Corp., 424 Pa. 185, 226
A.2d 484 (1967); and Devenney v. North Franklin Twp. Volunteer Fire
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mechanical rule that the plaintiff cannot prevail in such a case. Yet
courts are prone to follow the human desire to express legal results in terms of "rules of law." Consequently, if the court continues to receive cases in which it considers the evidence otherwise
insufficient the proposition that circumstantial evidence cannot
be used to prove both cause and negligence may continue until it
attains a status that will be difficult to attack.
The proposition that the plaintiff cannot establish his right
to recovery, first, by circumstantial proof of causation and, secondly, by circumstantial proof of defendant's negligence, would
appear to be nothing more than a refinement of the illogical and
discredited rule that an inference cannot be based on an inference. 20
The present status in Pennsylvania of 4the one-time prohibition
against basing an inference on an inference is very much beclouded
by conflicting decisions of the supreme court. At one time there
was substantial appellate authority which uniformly held that an
inference must be based on direct evidence and could not be based
on another inference 0 Then in Neeley v. Provident Life and
Accident Ins. Co.,31 the court analyzed the issue and specifically
held that an inference could be based on an inference. Neeley was
2
followed a year later by Jackson v. United States Pipe Line Co.a

which apparently settled the problem in Pennsylvania. However,
in Silinsky v. Pennsylvania R. R. 33 the supreme court affirmed a
judgment for the defendant on the opinion of the trial court which,
without mention of Neeley or Jackson, held that an inference cannot be based on an inference. Silinsky has not been subsequently
cited or overruled. Then in Commonwealth v. Bolger,34 on the authority of Neeley and Jackson but without mention of Silinsky, the
superior court held that an inference could be based on an inference. Finally, in Auerbach v. Phila. Transportation Co.35 the suDept., Inc., 209 Pa. Super. 378, 228 A.2d 61 (1968), where, without mention
of the problem under consideration here, the superior court allowed recovery on circumstantial evidence of cause and negligence.
29. See 1 T. WIGMORE, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, § 41
(3d ed. 1961).
30. See Gorman v. Simon Brahm's Sons, 298 Pa. 142, 50 A.2d 293
(1929); Fanning v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc., 264 Pa. 333, 107 A. 715 (1919);
Welsh v. Erie & W. Valley R.R., 181 Pa. 461, 37 A. 513 (1897); Philadelphia
City Pass. R.R. v. Henrice, 92 Pa. 431 (1880); McAleer v. McMurray, 58 Pa.
126 (1868); Douglas v. Mitchell, 25 Pa. 440 (1860); Carroll v. Willow Brook
Co., 108 Pa. Super. 580, 165 A. 550 (1933); Buck v. Quaker City Can Co.,
75 Pa. Super. 440 (1921); Hall v. Pennsylvania R.R., 60 Pa. Super. 235
(1915); Bube v. Weatherly Borough, 25 Pa. Super. 88 (1904).
31. 322 Pa. 417, 185 A. 784 (1936).
32. 325 Pa. 436, 191 A. 165 (1937).
33. 355 Pa. 499, 50 A.2d 293 (1947).
34. 182 Pa. Super. 309, 126 A.2d 536 (1956).
35. 421 Pa. 594, 221 A.2d 163 (1966). Auerbach specifically states that
a presumption cannot be based on a presumption, citing as authority Neeley
v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 322 Pa. 417, 185 A.2d 784 (1936),
which distinguished between a legal presumption and an inference of fact,
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preme court citing Neeley held that an inference cannot be based
on an inference, thus leaving the question in utter confusion.
THE FEDERAL RULE ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States involving
the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence under federal law have
arisen mainly from cases involving the Federal Employers' Liability Act 8 6 and the Jones Act.37 In earlier decisions, the Supreme
Court exhibited a marked conservatism in requiring strict proof of
negligence and causation. This conservatism is perhaps best
exemplified by the decision in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R.R.
v. Saxon,88 in which the Court upset a verdict for the plaintiff under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and held:
The cause is one of a peculiar class where we have frequently been obliged to give special consideration to the
facts in order to protect interstate carriers against unwarranted judgments and enforce observance of the Liabil-

ity Act as here interpreted.
Nobody saw the accident; no one can say with fair certainty how it occurred. Consistently with the facts disclosed it might have happened in one of several ways and
9
without casual negligence by the petitioner.
However, during the ensuing decade, the attitude of the Supreme Court toward the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence required to take a case to the jury underwent a marked change, both
in the results reached and in the rules stated for reaching those
results. 4 0 For example, in Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R.R., 4 1
a case with facts strikingly similar to those in Saxon, the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeal's reversal of a judgment for the
plaintiff4 2 and held: "It is not the function of a court to search
holding that a presumption can not be based on a presumption but an inference can be based on an inference. However, from the facts of Auerbach
it is clear that what Auerbach calls a presumption is actually an inference
of fact.
36. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908).
37. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
38. 284 U.S. 548 (1932). Up to the time of the decision in Saxon, the
Supreme Court of the United States had on many occasions upset jury verdicts for the plaintiff in FELA cases but had never reversed a judgment
for the defendant. See appendix of cases in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R.,
352 U.S. 521, 549 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
39. 284 U.S. at 459 (holding that the judgment must be for the
defendant where the circumstances disclose two equal and inconsistent inferences). See also Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlain, 388 U.S. 333 (1933).
40. Although never specifically overruled, the Saxon case, which has
not been cited by the Supreme Court since Chicago Great Western R.R. v.
Rambo, 298 U.S. 99, 101 (1936), certainly does not represent the law today.
41. 321 U.S. 29 (1944).
42. Although the opinion in Tennant v. Peoria & P.U.R.R., 321 U.S.
29, 32 (1944) provided that "mere speculation be not allowed," the Su-
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the record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to take
the case away from the jury on a theory that the proof gives equal
support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. '43 Whereas the
Court in Saxon had talked in terms of protecting interstate carriers,
later decisions talked in terms of interpreting the Federal Employ44
er's Liability Act liberally for the protection of the employee.
This process of liberalization culminated in the decision of
Lavender v. Kurn.45 There the Supreme Court established the following rules which have governed the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence in federal courts ever since:
It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or
the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is
required on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the
dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most
reasonable inference. Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached
does a reversible error appear ....

[T] he jury is free to

discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with
its conclusion. .

.

. [It is] immaterial that the court might

draw a contrary inference
or feel that another conclusion is
46
more reasonable.
The facts of Lavender v. Kurn clearly illustrate how liberal the
federal rule of sufficiency had become. Plaintiff's decedent, who
was employed as a switchman in defendant's railroad yard the
night of his death, threw a switch to enable a passenger train to
pass through the yard. Decedent was later found lying face down
near the track, dead from a fractured skull caused by a blow to the
back of his head. One of the examining doctors testified that the
fractured skull may have been caused by a blow from an object
attached to a train moving at the speed at which the passenger
train had passed decedent, or the fatal injury may have been
caused by a blow from a pipe or club.
Plaintiff's theory was that decedent had been struck by the
mail hook hanging from the passenger train. But in order for the
hook to have struck decedent, it had to be assumed that he was
standing on top of a small mound which existed only at one point
along the track. It also had to be assumed that the swaying of
the train at the precise moment it passed decedent caused the hook
to swing out sufficiently to reach decedent's head. The position in
preme Court subsequently in Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108,
114 (1963), realistically classified the findings in Tennant as "all somewhat
conjectural."
43. 321 U.S. at 35.
44. See, e.g., Lukon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 131 F.2d 327, 329 (3d Cir.
1942).
45. 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
46. Id. at 653.
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which decedent was found lying was inconsistent with his having
been 6truck by an object moving in the direction of the passenger
train, and there was evidence that a later examination of the train
revealed nothing protruding.
Defendant's theory was that decedent was murdered. There
was evidence that hobos frequented the area and that decedent
carried a pistol for protection. This pistol was found loose under
his body but his gold watch and ring were found on him. However,
six days later his billfold was found some distance away containing
certain personal papers but no money.
The full impact of Lavender v. Kurn can only be appreciated
if it is realized that there was absolutely no evidence of record that
the decedent was ever on the mound within striking distance of
the mail hook or that the mail hook was protruding. Nevertheless,
the jury's finding for the plaintiff was undisturbed by the Supreme Court.
Little would be gained by a detailed factual analysis of each
case under federal law concerning the sufficiency of the evidence47
decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Lavender v. Kurn.
However, two additional cases deserve specific attention as illustrations of extreme liberality of the federal test.
In Schultz v. Pennsylvania R.R. 48 the Court reversed a directed

verdict for the defendant in an action under the Jones Act to
recover damages for the death of a tug boat fireman who drowned
as a result of the alleged failure of the defendant to provide him
with a safe place to work. On the day of his death, decedent was
assigned to work on four tug boats docked side by side at a New
Jersey pier. He went immediately to check the boats without changing to his work clothes. About two hours after he was assigned to
the job, the decedent reported on the pier that he had finished
checking and was going back to the boats to change to his work
clothes and proceed with his other duties. He was last seen alive
walking to the nearest tug. Several hours later he was found to
be missing. Three of the four tugs were dark; one was partially
illuminated. There was some ice on the tugs and the water was
very cold. Because of a lack of sufficient workmen that night, decedent was required to take care of all four tugs, and in order
to perform this duty he had to step from one boat to another.
Several weeks later, decedent's body was found in the water
with a flashlight in his hand; he was clothed only in undershorts.
He had died of drowning. The defendant conceded that the deceased was not under the influence of alcohol when he reported to
work, that he did not commit suicide, that there was no foul play,
47. See, e.g., Michaelic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960);
Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
48. 350 U.S. 523 (1956).
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and that he had met his death by accident. The evidence showed
him to have been a capable and experienced workman.
The Supreme Court held that it could be inferred that the
decedent had slipped on the ice on one of the unlighted boats while
attempting to perform his duties. The fact that he might have
slipped where there was no ice or might have slipped from the
partially lighted boat would not prevent the issue from going to
the jury.
In Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. 49 the plaintiff was a crew

foreman who worked along the defendant railroad's right of way
in the Cuyahoga River Flats section of Cleveland. Nearby, a stagnant pool of water had existed for several years containing many
dead and decayed animals. Insects had been seen on and over the
stagnant pool and the defendant was aware of the condition of this
pool for a long time. While working near the pool, plaintiff was
bitten on the left leg under his trousers by what felt like a large
insect when he grabbed at it with his hand. The wound became
infected and eventually lead to the amputation of both legs. None
of the treating doctors could explain the etiology of his condition
although some of them characterized it as secondary to insect bite.
Plaintiff brought suit in the Ohio courts under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, alleging that the defendant was negligent in allowing the stagnant pool to accumulate dead animals and
attract insects. The trial resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff.
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that:
[T] here was no "direct evidence that the existence of the
unidentified bug at the time and place had any connection
with the stagnant and infested pool," [and there was no]
evidence which would negative the alternative possibility
that the insect had emanated from "the nearby putrid
mouth of the Cuyahoga River, or from weeds, and unsanitary places situated on the property not owned or controlled by the Railroad." 50
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and
reversed the Ohio court, holding that the evidence was sufficient
to raise an issue for the jury as to whether the insect emanated
from the pool.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PENNSYLVANIA AND FEDERAL
RULES ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Material differences exist between the formulations for testing
the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in the Pennsylvania
and federal courts. For example, the Pennsylvania court has
49. 372 U.S. 108 (1963).
50. 372 U.S. at 112, quoting from the opinion of the Ohio Court of
Appeals when the case was before that court. See 86 Ohio L. Abs. L, 173
N.E.2d 382 (1961).
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said: "[A] verdict will not be sustained which is based on conjecture or surmise or guess." 5' 1 On the other hand, a federal
court has held:
It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved
speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute
or the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw
different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to
settle the dispute by choosing
52 what seems to them to be the
most reasonable inference.
Thus, the test for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is far less
restrictive in the federal courts.
And while the Pennsylvania court strictly holds that the presumption of due care may be used only to rebut evidence of contributory negligence and may not be used in support of plaintiff's
proof of defendant's negligence, 3 the federal court has allowed
use of the presumption of decedent's due care in proving negligence.54 Furthermore, as shown earlier, there is authority in Pennsylvania prohibiting an inference based on an inference 5 but in
the federal courts there would appear to be no such prohibition.56
Aside from these formulations of the Pennsylvania and federal courts as to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, an examination of the factual situations involved in the various cases
demonstrates that a very basic difference exists between what
is sufficient in the federal courts and what is sufficient in the
Pennsylvania courts. Where the accident may or may not have
happened as a result of defendant's negligence, and where there is
51. Flaherty v. Pennsylvania R.R., 426 Pa. 83 85, 231 A.2d 179, 180
(1967).
52. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946). See also Gallick v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 114 (1963), in which the Supreme
Court, in referring to one of its prior decisions holding the plaintiff's evidence sufficient, said: "The question of how the victim met his death was
susceptible to various answers, all somewhat conjectural because of the
want of direct evidence ... "
53. See, e.g., Lescznski v. Pittsburgh Rys., 409 Pa. 102, 185 A.2d 538
(1962); Lear v. Shirk's Motor Express Corp., 397 Pa. 144, 152 A.2d 883
(1959); Gregory v. Atlantic Refining Co., 391 Pa. 399, 137 A.2d 450 (1958);
Dude v. Carothers, 379 Pa. 248, 108 A.2d 791 (1954); Skrutski v. Cochran,
341 Pa. 289, 19 A.2d 106 (1941).
54. See Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R.R., 321 U.S. 29, 34 (1944),
in which the Supreme Court, in discussing the evidence which supported
plaintiff's proof of negligence, stated: "To this evidence must be added the
presumption that the deceased was actually engaged in the performance of
those duties and exercised due care of his own safety at the time of his
death."
55. See p. 415 supra.
56. See Sadler v. United States, 303 F.2d 664, 665 (10th Cir. 1962);
Fegles Construction Co. v. McLaughlin Construction Co., 205 F.2d 637, 640
(9th Cir. 1953); F.A.R. Liquidating Corp. v. Brownell, 140 F. Supp. 535,
539-40 (D. Del. 1956).
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no specific circumstance to which the plaintiff can point as indicating the accident happened as he contended, the case will be submitted to the jury in the federal courts but will result in finding
for the defendant, as a matter of law, in the Pennsylvania courts.
For example, in Lavender v. Kurn,5 7 the decedent may or may not
have been standing in a position where the mail hook could have
struck him when the train went by; in Schultz v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 5 the decedent may or may not have fallen from an area of
the tug where there was ice on the deck; and in Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 9 the bug may or may not have come from the
stagnant pool on defendant's land.60 On the other hand, it can be
stated with confidence that under federal law Steiner v. Pittsburgh Rys. 61 and Flaherty v. Pennsylvania R.R., 62 would have been
submitted to the jury.
THE PENNSYLVANIA AND FEDERAL RULES ON THE FORM
OF EXPERT OPINION

In cases involving circumstantial evidence, the parties frequently rely on the testimony of expert witnesses to establish or
at least bolster their case.63 There is a marked difference between
the Pennsylvania and federal law with regard to the form which
expert opinion must take in order to qualify for submission to
the jury.
Under Pennsylvania law it is not sufficient for the expert to
say that the result might have been brought about by the alleged
cause or even that it most probably was. He must state that in
his opinion the result did come from the cause alleged, and a less
direct expression or opinion falls below the required standard of
proof.6 4 Furthermore, if the party with the burden of proof calls
57. 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
58. 350 U.S. 523 (1956).
59. 372 U.S. 108 (1963).
60. The following language of the Supreme Court of Ohio, which was
specifically disapproved by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108 (1963), resembles the hold-

ings of many Pennsylvania cases:
[T]here was no "direct evidence that the existence of the unidenti-

fied bug at the time and place had any connection with the stagnant and infested pool," [and there was no] evidence which
would negative the alternative possibility that the insect had
emanated from "the nearby putrid mouth of the Cuyahoga River,
or from weeds, or unsanitary places situated on property not owned
or controlled by the railroad."
61. 415 Pa. 549, 204 A.2d 254 (1964).
62. 426 Pa. 83, 231 A.2d 179 (1967).
63. See, e.g., Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co., 190 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1951).
64. See Florig v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 388 Pa. 419, 130 A.2d 445 (1957);
Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 68 (1954);
Wargo v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 376 Pa. 168, 101 A.2d 638 (1954); Powell v.
Risser, 372 Pa. 60, 92 A.2d 417 (1953); Vorbnoff v. Mesta Machine Co., 286
Pa. 199, 133 A. 256 (1926).
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two or more experts who disagree with each other on essential
points, the evidence may not be submitted to the jury even
though the testimony65of one of the experts standing by itself would
have been sufficient.
On the other hand, under federal law expert opinions that the
result probably was or might have been brought about by the alleged cause have been held sufficient.66 Further, a conflict between
the testimony of two experts called by the plaintiff does not destroy plaintiff's case provided the testimony of at least one expert
is sufficient.6 7 In Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp.,68
an action under the Jones Act, the Supreme Court held:
The jury's power to draw the inference that the aggravation of petitioner's tubercular condition, evident so shortly
after the accident, was in fact caused by the accident, was
not impaired by the failure of any medical witness to testify
that it was in fact the cause. Neither can it be impaired
by the lack of medical unanimity as to the respective likelihood of the potential causes of the aggravation, or by the
fact that other potential causes of the aggravation existed
and were not conclusively negatived by the proofs. The
matter does not turn on the use of a particular form of
word by the physicians in giving their testimony. The
members of the jury, not the medical witnesses, were sworn
to make a legal determination of the question of causation.
They were entitled to take all the circumstances, including
the medical testimony, into consideration.6 9
THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE TESTS

In Herron v. Southern Pacific Co. 7 0 the Supreme Court held

that it was proper in a diversity action for the district court to
direct a verdict for the defendant where plaintiff's contributory
negligence appeared as a matter of law, notwithstanding a provision of the Constitution of Arizona requiring submission of the issue
of contributory negligence to the jury in all cases. On the facts of
Herron no issue was presented with regard to the right to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment. The Court based its holding
on the proposition "that state laws cannot alter the essential character or function of a Federal Court,' 1 that is, on a supremacy of
federal law with regard to the administration of the federal courts.
65. See Menarde v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 376 Pa. 497
(1954); Mudano v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 289 Pa. 51 (1927).
66. Brett v. J.M. Carras, Inc., 203 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1953); Neff v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1947), affd, 173 F.2d 931 (3d
Cir. 1949); Armit v. Loveland, 115 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1940).
67. Neff v. Pennsylvania R.R., 173 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1949).
68. 361 U.S. 107 (1959).
69. Id. at 109-110 (footnote omitted).
70. 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
71. 283 U.S. at 94.

Spring 1968]

FEDERAL DIVERSITY CASES

The authority of Herron was severely undermined by the historic decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,72 in which the Supreme
Court established the proposition that where federal jurisdiction
is based on the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the federal
courts are to apply State court decisions as well as state statutes
when deciding questions of "substantive" law. And the authority
of Herron appeared entirely wiped out when in Cities Service Oil
Co. v. Dunlap,73 the Supreme Court, in applying the Erie doctrine,
held that the burden of proof in a diversity action is a substantive
matter which is governed by state law.
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York74 the Court solidified the Erie
doctrine holding that the distinction between substantive and procedural law must be made in such a manner that the outcome of
the litigation will be substantially the same as it would be in
the State court in order to prevent forum shopping.
Applying the Erie doctrine as developed in the foregoing cases,
it would at first seem inevitable that the state test of the sufficiency of evidence would prevail in diversity of citizenship cases.
Indeed, many lower federal courts reached that result with little
or no discussion of the question,7 5 presumably because the issue
was not raised by the attorneys. However, the Supreme Court
in two recent decisions 76 has acknowledged the existence of a substantial question as to whether the state or federal test of sufficiency of evidence should be applied in diversity cases, but the
Court found it unnecessary to decide the question in those cases.
72. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
73. 308 U.S. 208 (1939). Since Cities was an equity action, no issue as
to the constitutional right to a jury trial was present. The seventh amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury only in an action at common
law, and equity actions have been held not to be within its surview. See
N.L.R.V. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937).
74. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
75. The following cases have applied the state test of sufficiency:
Ratay v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 378 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1967); Sleek v.
J.C. Penney, 324 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1963); Gilbreath v. Southern R. Co., 323
F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1963); Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586 (8th Cir.
1960); Trivette v. New York Life Ins. Co., 283 F.2d 441 (6th Cir. 1960);
Miller v. Boston Ins. Co., 271 F.2d (5th Cir. 1959); Stofer v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 249 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1957); Rowe v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 231 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956);
Lovas v. General Motors Corp., 212 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1954); Croll v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 198 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1952); Nattens v.
Grolier Society Inc., 195 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1952); O'Donnell v. Geneva
Metal Wheel Co., 190 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1950); Gutierrez v. Public Serv.
Interstate Transp. Co., 168 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1948); Moran v. Pittsburgh Des
Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846
(1948); Waldron v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 141 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.
1944); Cooper v. Brown, 125 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1942); Lennig v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 871, 872 (3d Cir. 1941); Sierocinski v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 118 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1941).
76. Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152, 156 (1964); Dick v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
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among the lower fedAs a result, a marked conflict has developed
77
eral courts which have considered the issue.
The handling of the issue by the Third Circuit presents an
interesting picture of the confusion resulting from the failure
of the Supreme Court to settle the question. In Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of America v. Clum78 the Third Circuit described the question as "interesting and complicated," but reserved decision of the
question for a more appropriate case. Then in a subsequent line
of cases the court held that79the issue was governed by local law
with little, if any, discussion.
But in Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.80 the Third Circuit held that federal law was determinative of whether an issue
was to be determined by the court or the jury. In McDermott v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. 8 1 the court treated the
issue as open, and in Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc. 2 the court,
sitting en banc, held that "the principle of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
does not determine the functions between court and jury. This is
77. Compare the following cases which have applied the federal test
of sufficiency with the cases cited in note 72, supra: Boeing Co. v. Shipman,
389 F.2d 507 (5th 1968); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Schlamowitz, 351 F.2d 509 (4th
Cir. 1965); Shirey v. Louisville N.Ry., 327 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1964); Safeway
Stores v. Fannan, 308 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1962); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. White,
288 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835; Rutherford v. Illinois
Cert. R.R., 276 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1960); Revlon v. Buchanan, 271 F.2d 795
(5th Cir. 1959); Fruit Indus, Inc. v. Petty, 268 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1959);
Phipps v. N.V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche Stoomvart, Maats, 259 F.2d
143 (9th Cir. 1958); Royal Indemn. Co. v. Curtis, 256 F.2d 329 (5th Cir.
1958); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Wood, 253 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1958);
Progue v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957); Reuter v.
Eastern Airlines, 226 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1955); Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F.2d
429 (2d Cir. 1955); Burcham v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 209 F.2d 35 (4th Cir.
1954); Davis Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Norfolk-So. Ry., 204 F.2d 839 (4th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 824; Wright v. Paramount-Richards Theaters,
Inc., 198 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1952); Lowry v. Seabord Airline R.R., 171 F.2d
625 (5th Cir. 1948); Guthrie v. Great American Ins. Co., 151 F.2d 738 (4th
Cir. 1945); White v. New York Life Ins. Co., 145 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1944);
McSweeney v. Prudential Ins. Co., 128 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 658; Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir.
1942); Gorham v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ins. Co., 114 F.2d 97 (4th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 688 (1941); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Carriker,
107 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1939); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Clum, 106 F.2d 592
(3d Cir. 1939).
79. See Sierocinski v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 118 F.2d 531,
534-5 (3d Cir. 1941); Lennig v. New York Life Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 871 (3d
Cir. 1941); Cooper v. Brown, 125 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1942); Waldron v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 141 F.2d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 1944); Moran v.
Pittsburgh Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908, 917 (3d Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948).
80. 137 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943). In
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 527 n.1l
(1958), the Supreme Court cites Ettelson, and Cooper v. Brown, 125 F.2d
874 (3d Cir. 1942) as being in conflict with each other.
81. 255 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1958).
82. 278 F.2d 79, 84 (3d Cir. 1960).
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controlled solely by Federal law."
and Diederich v. American News Co.

The
Lind court cited Ettelson
3

In Dill v. Scuka 4 the Third Circuit again noted the question as
open, but reserved resolution since the evidence before the court
was sufficient under both state and federal tests. Likewise in
Pritchardv. Ligget and Myers Tobacco Co., 5 the court again noted
the question as open, but unnecessary to decide in the case before
them. In Sleek v. J.C. Penny, 6 the court reverted to its prior
holding that sufficiency of evidence in a diversity case is measured by state standards, making no mention of its own prior contrary decisions. In Bruce Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp.87 and Wigder v. Erickson"' the court, without discussion, cited Lavender v. Kurn 9 as authority for the sufficiency
of evidence.
In Woods v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co.9 0 the court treated
the issue as an open question, discussed it at some length, but disposed of the case without deciding the issue. In Ratay v. Lincoln
National Life Ins. Co.,9' the court held state law applied, again without discussing the issue.92 Finally, in Rumsey v. Great A. & P. Co.,
Inc.,92 a a divided three judge court held that the state standard applies.
It is submitted that there are two fundamental reasons why
the federal test of sufficiency should be applied. First, the Supreme Court has changed its direction from literal application of
the outcome-determination test propounded in the Erie case and the
cases which followed Erie. Secondly, the seventh amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial
to suitors in the federal courts irrespective of whether jurisdiction
is based on diversity of citizenship or a federal cause of action.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective less
83. 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942).
84. 279 F.2d 145, 157 (3d Cir. 1960).
85. 295 F.2d 292, 295 (3d Cir. 1961).
86. 324 F.2d 467, 471 (3d Cir. 1963).
87. 325 F.2d 2, 22 (3d Cir. 1963).
88. 339 F.2d 32, 34 (3d Cir. 1964).
89. 327 U.S. 654 (1946). See discussion p. 417 supra.
90. 346 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1965).
91. 378 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1967).
92. Both the Woods and Ratay cases involved the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove fraud as a defense to a claim by the beneficiary under a

life insurance policy. In Woods, the court held that Pennsylvania law de-

fined the elements of the defense of fraud but that the question of whether
Pennsylvania or federal law determined the sufficiency of the proof of
those elements was an open question which it did not have to decide. In
Ratay, without reference to Woods of the issue under discussion here, the
court reversed a judgment for the insurance company because of the trial
court's failure to charge the jury under the Pennsylvania law that the
defense of fraud must be proven by evidence that is "clear, precise and
indubitable."
92a. - - F.2d - - (3d Cir. July 10, 1968) (reargument for court en

banc pending).
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than five months after the decision in the Erie case. Prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules, civil procedure in the federal
courts was governed by the Conformity Act of 187293 which required the district court to apply "as near as may be" the procedures governing action at law in the state in which the district court
was held. With the exception of specific references in the Federal
Rules to state law 94 the rules substituted national uniformity for
conformity to state practice, thus, creating an impetus contrary to
the Erie doctrine.
It was not long before the Federal Rules and the Erie doctrine
ran into head on collision. In Palmer v. Hoffman,95 the Supreme
Court was faced with an apparent conflict between Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8, which designated contributory negligence as an
affirmative defense, and state law which provided that the plaintiff must prove his freedom from contributory negligence. The
Supreme Court, however, avoided the conflict by holding that Rule
8 dealt only with the burden of pleading contributory negligence
and not with the burden of proving it.
The Erie doctrine reached its high water mark when in Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer and Warehouse CoY6 the Supreme Court held
the plaintiff's claim barred by Kansas statute of limitations, even
though the plaintiff had commenced his action within the period of
limitation according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, which
provides that "a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court."97 But plaintiff had failed to comply with Kansas
law, which required that service be made on the defendant within
the statutory period. The Supreme Court succinctly stated the
basis for its decision: "If recovery could not be had in the state
court, it should be denied in the federal court."981 At this point,
the law seemed settled and Erie reigned supreme.
Later cases, however, developed a theme which has shaken the
rigidity of Erie and Ragan. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc.,9 9 a personal injury diversity action, the Supreme
Court held that the issue of whether defendant was the statutory
employer of the plaintiff, and, therefore, protected from liability
for common law negligence, must be determined by the jury in the
federal court. This was true regardless of the state rule that the
defense of workmen's compensation was to be determined by the
93. Act of June 1, 1872 ch. 255, § 1-16, 17 Stat. 196.
94. The following FEDERAL RULES OF CMIL PROCEDURE make specific
reference to state law: RULE 4(d) (service of process), RULE 17 (b) (capacity to sue), RULE 27(a) (use of depositions), RULE 43(a) (admissibility of
evidence), RULE 62(f) (stay of proceedings to enforce judgment), RULE
64 (execution).

95. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
96. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
98. 337 U.S. at 532.
99. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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court. 10 0 Citing Heron v. Southern Pacific Co. 0 1 the Supreme
Court held:
The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights
and obligation .

.

. cannot in every case exact compliance

with a state rule-not bound up with rights and obligations-which disrupts the federal
10 2 system of allocating functions between judge and jury.
The Byrd decision upholding the federal over the state rule
breathed new life into Heron. In the meantime, the courts of
appeals had given the Federal Rules supremacy over state law with
regard to the admissibility of evidence, 10 3 jury voir dires1 4 and the
disposition of post-trial motions. 10 5
In Hanna v. Plumer'0 6 defendant obtained summary judgment
on the ground that while service of process had been made in conformity with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) (1), it did not
meet the requirements of Massachusetts law. The lower court relied on Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co.10 7 and Guarantee Trust
Co. v. York. 0
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed holding:
One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to
bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting
away from local rules. This is especially true of matter
which relate to the administration of legal proceedings, an
area in which federal courts have traditionally exerted
strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers
Congress expressly conferred in the Rules. The purpose
of the Erie doctrine, even as extended in York and Ragan,
was never to bottle up federal courts with 'outcome-determinative' and 'integral-relations' stoppers-when there are
'affirmative countervailing [federal] considerations' and
when there is a Congressional mandate (the Rules) supported by constitutional authority10°
The Hanna case represents a marked departure from the strict
100.

The diversity action was originally brought in the District Court

for the Western District of South Carolina. The respondent argued that the
issue of immunity under South Carolina law should be decided by the
court and not the jury on the authority of Adams v. Davidson-Paxon Co.,
230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566 (1957). See also Magenau v. Aetna Freight
Lines Inc., 260 U.S. 273 (1959).
101. 283 U.S. 96 (1931). See discussion p. 422 supra.
102. 356 U.S. at 538 (citations omitted).
103. Rain v. Pavkos, 357 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1966); Hope v. Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961).
104. E.g., Kiernan v. Van Shaik, 346 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965).
105. E.g., Silverii v. Kramer, 314 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1963).
106. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
107. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
108. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
109. 380 U.S. at 472-73, quoting Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963).
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application of the Erie doctrine presented in Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Wharehouse Co. 110 and it may be reasonably argued
that Hanna overrules Ragan."'
Thus, there are many areas today where the outcome of the
litigation may vary widely depending on whether it is tried in the
federal or state court, contrary to the orthodox teachings of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins".2 and Guarantee Trust Co. v. York."- The fact
that the outcome may be affected is no longer, by itself, a valid
argument for holding state law determinative of the sufficiency
of the evidence.
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than
114
according to the rules of the common law.
The amendment was proposed to the legislatures of the states by
the First Congress on September 25, 1789, and was ratified on December 15, 1791. It makes no distinction between cases in the
federal courts arising under the Constitution, treaties, and laws of
the United States, and cases arising under the laws of the state
and brought into federal court because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties. That the seventh amendment was intended to
apply to diversity of citizenship cases can hardly be doubted when
it is remembered that the First Judiciary Act, which was passed
by the First Congress on September 24, 1789, the day before the
Congress proposed the seventh amendment, provided for diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction in cases in which the matter in dispute
exceeded $500.00. The act made no provision, however, for jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States." 5 With the exception of an Act passed in 1801
110. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
111. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476-77 (1965) (concurring
opinion); see also Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 244 F. Supp. (S.D.
N.Y. 1965), which held that Hanna overruled Ragan. Contra, Sylvester v.
Messler, 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965).
112. 304 U.S. 664 (1938).
113. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). York announced the "outcome-determinative"
test. That is, state law was controlling if use of the federal law would
work a different outcome.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
115. See FiRST JuDIcIAL ACT, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat.
73. Although article III, section 2, of the United States Constitution provides that the "judicial power of the United States shall extend to all
cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority. . . ." The Article is not self-executing and, therefore, required
an act of Congress to confer actual jurisdiction.
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which was repealed a year later,"0 there was no general grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts in cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States until the Judiciary
Act of 1875.1"7
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preserves "the
right to trial by jury as declared by the seventh amendment to
the Constitution" with no distinction between diversity cases and
other federal cases. Regardless of any previous question that may
have existed on the point, the Supreme Court in Simler v. Conner" 8 unequivocally held that the right to a jury trial in a diversity
action in the federal court is required by the seventh amendment.
It must also be remembered that Erie was concerned with the
interpretation of the Rules of Decisions Act which provides:
The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decisions in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply. 19
The specific holding of the Erie case was that the Rules of Decisions
Act required the application of state law as created not only by
state statute but also as declared by the highest court of the
state. As stated in the Erie opinion:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall
be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its high12 0
est court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.
Of course, it could be argued that while the seventh amendment requires that the litigants be given the right to try the issues
of negligence and contributory negligence before a jury if there is
sufficient evidence to create a jury question, whether or not the
evidence is sufficient should be determined by state law. 121 Although the vast majority of Supreme Court cases dealing with
the sufficiency of the evidence do not discuss the problem in terms
116. See Act of February 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed
by Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
117. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1-10, 18 Stat. 470 (Part 3).
118. 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963).
119. This statute was adopted as section 34 of the First Judiciary Act
of September 24, 1879, 1 Stat. 73, and exists to the present time, having
been amended only in phraseology. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964), amending
28 U.S.C. § 725 (1940).
120. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
121. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943), where
the Supreme Court held that the seventh amendment was designed to
preserve the basic institution; see particularly Galloway at 390 n.22, where
the Court notes that if it allowed the constitutional argument to be carried to its extreme, constitutional arguments in reference to the right to a
jury trial could be mustered in support of the admissibility of evidence.
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of the seventh amendment, 122 the Supreme Court has held in cases
arising under federal law that an erroneous legal ruling that the
plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to carry his case
to the jury is violative of his constitutional right to a jury trial.'2 '
Many of the land mark decisions on the sufficiency of the evidence
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act have arisen in the
state courts 1 24 where the seventh amendment to the Federal
Constitution would have no application. 12 5 The Supreme Court
has, nevertheless, applied the same broad standards of sufficiency
to those cases. 126 And in at least one case arising from the state
courts the Supreme Court discussed the question27 of sufficiency of
the evidence in terms of the seventh amendment.
It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that the Supreme Court
will not, when presented with the proper case, hold that the sufficiency of the evidence in diversity cases is governed by federal
standards. In the absence of a definitive holding by the high
court the only thing that will prevent the lower courts from applying the federal standard will be the continued failure of many
attorneys to assert the applicability of the federal law.
CONCLUSION

It appears that while in some cases the result will not be affected by the choice between the federal and state tests of sufficiency of the evidence, there are many cases in which the choice
of law will be crucial to the outcome. This is true not only with
regard to the general test of sufficiency but also with regard to
the requirements of expert opinion.
While it is difficult to set forth the state and federal tests of
sufficiency in terms of rules which can readily be applied to various
factual situations, it is clear that the federal test is markedly more
liberal than the Pennsylvania test. Under the federal test it is
generally sufficient to create a jury question if the plaintiff's evidence is such that the accident may have happened the way the
122. See, e.g., Tennant v. Peoria & P.U.R.R., 321 U.S. 29 (1944); Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
123. See, e.g., Schultz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U.S. 523, 524 (1956);
Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942). See also, Grunenthal v.
Long Island R.R., 388 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 1651
(1968), where the Supreme Court will consider whether under the seventh
amendment a federal appellate court can examine and reduce as excessive
the amount of damages awarded by a jury.
124. See, e.g., Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108 (1963);
Lavendar v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
125. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S.
151, 158 (1931).
126. See Brady v. Southern R.R., 320 U.S. 476 (1943), where the Supreme Court held that the sufficiency of the evidence in state court FELA
cases is to be measured by federal standards.
127. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 325 U.S. 500, 508 n.18 (1957).
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plaintiff contends. However, under the Pennsylvania test, the
plaintiff must be able to point to some circumstance which shows
that the accident occurred in the manner which he contends.
Moreover, expert opinion used to bolster the plaintiff's case under
federal law may be expressed in terms of probabilities, while
under Pennsylvania law expert opinion must be definite and without any equivocation. Thus, in many cases there will be a distinct
advantage to the plaintiff under federal law.
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the choice of law problem between the federal and state
tests of sufficiency in diversity cases, it has left the problem unanswered. This has resulted in considerable confusion and divergence of opinion on the point in the lower courts, some lower
federal courts having applied the state test in diversity cases on
the authority of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.12 However, a critical
analysis of the Erie doctrine, of recent Supreme Court cases interpreting Erie, and of recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the
application of the seventh amendment guarantee of a jury trial to
diversity cases, clearly demonstrates that the federal rather than
the state test should and will be applied by the Supreme Court
when it is squarely faced with the issue.

128.

304 U.S. 64 (1934).
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